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Financial incentives have been used in a variety of settings to motivate behaviors that might not
otherwise be undertaken. They have been highlighted as particularly useful in settings that require a
single behavior, such as appointment attendance or vaccination. They also have differential effects based
on socioeconomic status in some applications (e.g. smoking). To further investigate these claims, we
tested the effect of providing different types of non-cash ﬁnancial incentives on the return rates of
chlamydia specimen samples amongst 16e24 year-olds in England. In 2011 and 2012, we ran a two-stage
randomized experiment involving 2988 young people (1489 in Round 1 and 1499 in Round 2) who
requested a chlamydia screening kit from Freetest.me, an online and text screening service run by
Preventx Limited. Participants were randomized to control, or one of ﬁve types of ﬁnancial incentives in
Round 1 or one of four ﬁnancial incentives in Round 2. We tested the effect of ﬁve types of incentives on
specimen sample return; reward vouchers of differing values, charity donation, participation in a lottery,
choices between a lottery and a voucher and including vouchers of differing values in the test kit prior to
specimen return. Financial incentives of any type, did not make a signiﬁcant difference in the likelihood
of specimen return. The more deprived individuals were, as calculated using Index of Multiple Depri-
vation (IMD), the less likely they were to return a sample. The extent to which incentive structures
inﬂuenced sample return was not moderated by IMD score. Non-cash ﬁnancial incentives for chlamydia
testing do not seem to affect the specimen return rate in a chlamydia screening program where test kits
are requested online, mailed to requestors and returned by mail. They also do not appear more or less
effective in inﬂuencing test return depending on deprivation level.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Financial incentives present policy options to change patient
behavior in a number of areas including smoking and weight loss
(Marteau, Ashcroft, & Oliver, 2009). Several reviews have concluded
that ﬁnancial incentives are successful in inﬂuencing ‘one-shot’
behaviors, such as immunizations and appointment attendance
(Kane, Johnson, Town, & Butler, 2004; Sutherland, Christianson, &
Leatherman, 2008). This study considers the generalizability of
this conclusion by using a large, randomized experiment occurringuse, London School of Eco-
2A 2AE, UK.
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY licensein a natural setting to test the effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives in
promoting chlamydia testing.
While effectiveness is one part of the decision to implement
ﬁnancial incentives, acceptability is another. A series of experi-
ments examining the acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives for
smoking cessation and weight loss, found that the UK general
public’s acceptability of ﬁnancial incentives increased with their
level of effectiveness (Promberger, Dolan, & Marteau, 2012). Effec-
tiveness is a crucial aspect to any successful incentive program in
the eyes of the public, and so it is important to investigate whether
and which types of incentives work most successfully.
In addition to effectiveness, considerations of equity also matter.
A meta-analysis of trials found socioeconomic status to have an
inﬂuence on the effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives applied in
smoking, diet and physical activity contexts (Mantzari et al., in
preparation). Policymakers could also use ﬁnancial incentives to
reduce health inequalities by targeting behaviors disproportionately
engaged in by poorer people (Oliver & Brown, 2012). Incentives can
be seen as coercive, however, even subtly forcing individuals to act.
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(Ashcroft, 2011; Lunze & Paasche-Orlow, 2013).
Beyond effectiveness and equity, considerations of ﬁnancial sus-
tainability are important for policy planning. Offering ﬁnancial in-
centives presents a cost to health system payers. This immediate cost
may or may not be worth the future costs avoided. The degree to
which payers avoid future costs depends on incentive size and
effectiveness (Giuffrida & Torgeson, 1997) as well as whether the
effect of the incentive is sustainable over time (e.g. Volpp et al., 2008).
Chlamydia is the most common sexually transmitted infection
(STI) in the United Kingdom (UK). The UK Department of Health’s
goal for 2010/11 was screening 35% of 16e24 year olds through the
National Chlamydia Screening Programme (NCSP). The average
across England was 28.5% from April 2011 to March 2012, ranging
across English regions (Strategic Health Authorities) from 24.5% to
35.7% (NCSP, 2012a).
Young people return about 70% of chlaymdia test kits requested
via Freetest.me, an online and text screening service run by Pre-
ventx Limited. 47 out of the 152 primary care trusts (PCTs)1 in
England contract Preventx Limited to dispatch at-home chlamydia
test kits requested by text or online as part of the NCSP.While 70% is
an impressive return rate, it leaves almost 1/3 of dispensed tests
unused. Therefore, we consider whether non-cash ﬁnancial in-
centives might increase sample return rates and whether in a dif-
ferential manner depending on socioeconomic status.
A number of studies have investigated the effect of ﬁnancial in-
centives to encourage chlamydia screening but only a few have
examined the use of incentives for mail-in chlamydia screening
while including a control group (Molinar &Nardone, 2010). Lowet al.
(2007) found that offering a £10 voucher had no effect (compared to
no incentive) on chlamydia screening uptake in a mail-based home
screening program in England (n ¼ 838). Niza, Rudisill, and Dolan
(2013) tested the effect of offering a voucher (£5) and lottery
participation (£200) on young adults’ participation in chlamydia
testing in four London student halls of residence (n ¼ 1060). In-
centives of any type were associated with a higher likelihood of
participating in screening than those offered no incentive while the
group offered a £5 voucher were more likely to return the test kit
than those offered lottery participation. Zenner et al. (2012)
compared areas of England that have employed patient ﬁnancial
incentives of any type and those that have not and found a small
positive effect of offering vouchers but no effect of prize draws.
Currie et al. (2010) compared chlamydia screening participation
in Australia when offering either education sessions and non-
ﬁnancial incentives over six months (n-2786) or four days of text
messages and offering a cash incentive of AUD $10 (n ¼ 866). The
shorter text message/ﬁnancial incentive strategy had a higher test
uptake rate. Downing et al. (2012) found that offering a cash incen-
tive of AUD $10 alongside of a text message reminder increased the
likelihood that individuals who had previously tested positive for
chlamydia would be re-tested in the recommended 3e4 month
timeframe, but re-testing rateswere still lower thandesired (n¼ 94).
Against this background, ﬁnancial incentives could be effective
in increasing specimen return rates. Effectiveness alone should not
determine the use of ﬁnancial incentives e there are other ethical
concerns (e.g. coercion, acceptability) and possible gaming effects
that need to be considered e but evidence of effectiveness would,
at least, suggest that these additional issues require closer scrutiny.
Chlaymdia screening rates from the NCSP are highest in the most
deprived parts of England where the populations are also at
greatest risk of infection (Sheringham et al., 2011). Therefore,1 Primary care trusts e purchase care for population in their geographic catch-
ment area.offering incentives could make differences in screening coverage
across deprivation levels grow evenwider. This study examines the
effect of offering English 16e24 year olds non-cash ﬁnancial in-
centives on their likelihood of returning a specimen sample for
chlamydia testing. We also investigate the extent to which socio-
economic status inﬂuences incentive effectiveness.
Well-known theoretical concepts from behavioral economics
that would be expected to affect behavior motivated the design of
ﬁnancial incentive schemes used in this study. We include lotteries
because of evidence that people overweight low probabilities of
high rewards (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Lotteries
have also proved successful within contexts of ﬁnancial incentives
for health behaviors (Volpp et al., 2008). We also tested the choice
of engaging in a lottery or receiving a certain reward of the expected
value of a lottery option (both at the £5 and £10 levels) to examine
whether allowing the choice between rewards might engage par-
ticipants more deeply in decision-making regarding incentives as
people prefer having options (Kamenica, 2012). The notion behind
endowments is that by offering a participant a gesture of good-will
or thanks, it might motivate reciprocity through kit return (Cialdini,
2001). Finally, the ability to give to charity taps into other-regarding
motivations for behavior change (Burger & Lynham, 2010).Methods
Setting and participants
We ran this study in conjunctionwith Preventx Limited’s online
and text screening service, Freetest.me. Individuals requesting test
kits received them via post along with a pre-addressed stamped
return box for their specimen sample (either urine or vaginal swab)
to be sent to Freetest.me’s laboratory in England for processing. The
sample can be mailed back using a regular mailbox. Freetest.me
notiﬁes individuals that their results are ready via the method
chosen (text or email) when requesting their test kit. They can
retrieve results through an online tracking system on the Free-
test.me website. Individuals can also request that they be called if
the result is positive.
Internet andmobile (remote testing) are not the only way young
people can take a chlamydia test in England. The biggest non-NCSP
portion of chlamydia testing for young people between April 2011
and May 2012 was performed via genitourinary medicine (GUM)
clinics, making up 27.5% of all tests across England. 54.2% of all tests
were through the NCSP of which remote testing is part (4.4% of total
chlamydia tests) as are GP-based tests (9.2%) (NCSP, 2012b). The
breakdown of remote testing versus GP-based tests as well as other
NCSP testing channels varies depending on the PCT. At the time of
this study, Freetest.me tested about 50,000e60,000 patients
annually.
Our study sample came from individuals requesting test kits
through the Freetest.me Internet site (both via computer and mo-
bile phoneweb access) and text message systems. It includes young
people from all parts of England except those patients covered by
the North East Strategic Health Authority (one of ten regional
health bodies) because no PCT in this area contracted chlamydia
screening through Preventx Limited at the time of this study.
Each test kit request was randomly allocated to an incentive or
the control group (no incentive) sequentially as it came into Free-
test.me. A slip (Appendices 1 and 2) was included in each kit with
details of the randomly assigned incentive scheme. Freetest.me
used a scanned barcode on each slip and a unique barcode identiﬁer
on the test kit itself as well as the specimen vial to keep track of
participant randomization across control and treatment groups. To
ensure patient conﬁdentiality, we did not have access to the
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rewards. Therefore, Preventx administered the incentives.
The research was funded by a Strategic Award from the Well-
come Trust Biomedical Ethics Programme. The funder had no
involvement in this study’s design, the collection, analysis and
interpretation of data or the writing of the manuscript. This study
received ethical approval from the London School of Economics &
Political Science Research Ethics Committee.
This study involved two rounds (Rounds 1 and 2). Round 2 was
undertaken to ensure the robustness of ﬁndings from Round 1. The
ﬁrst randomization process was fromMay 18eJune 3, 2011. We had
a target sample size of 1500 with test kit requests randomized
across ﬁve incentive groups plus a control. We have data on 1489
kits as 11 were incorrectly scanned or labels fell off and therefore
not traceable (0.7% lost).
The second randomization process was from May 8e18, 2012.
Effect sizes from Round 1 informed power calculations for Round 2.
We calculated the sample size needed for 80% power in showing
the difference between groups and 5% two-sided error. Calculations
were based on the return rate of the control group and the highest
treatment group return rate in Round 1 and demonstrated a sample
size of 300 for each group. To account for lost kits based on Round 1,
we increased each group to 305. We had a target sample size of
1525 with requests randomized across four incentive groups plus a
control. We have data on 1500 kits as 25 were not traceable (1.6%
lost). We do not have Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) infor-
mation for one participant in Round 2 therefore our sample is 1499
kits. This is total of 2988 across both Rounds. Appendices 3 and 4
show the ﬂow of participants through request of text kit, inter-
vention and follow-up in Rounds 1 and 2, respectively (Table 1).
We chose a Tesco voucher for each incentive group except the
charity group because of the reward’s universality. Tesco has stores
across England and an online presence as a major English retailer. It
is recognizable regardless of gender, socioeconomic status and in-
terests. Tesco sells awide range of products from food to clothing to
electrical equipment. We chose ‘Children in Need’ as the charity
because it is well-known across England and has a generally posi-
tive appeal. In both Rounds, respondents had 18 days to return their
sample, after which they received the normal Freetest.me protocol
of a text reminder. Freetest.me considers a kit invalid if individuals
do not return the specimen sample 30 days from the request date.
While specimen samples returned after 30 days are still tested byTable 1
Incentive types tested.
Group name Round Description
Control 1 þ 2 No incentive of
Voucher
GBP 5 voucher 1 þ 2 Receive £5 Tesc
GBP 10 voucher 2 Receive £10 Tes
Lottery
Lottery with expected value (EV) of £5 1 Entered into a l
a 10% chance o
Choice e certain reward versus lottery
Choice with EV of GBP 5 1 Given choice of
entered into th
Choice with EV of GBP 10 2 Given choice of
entered into a l
and a 10% chan
Endowment
GBP 5 endowment 1 Receive £5 Tesc
GBP 10 endowment 2 Receive £10 Tes
Charity
GBP 5 charity 1 Receive £5 don
Need (a UK chilPreventx, for the purposes of this study, they are considered ‘non-
returns’ rather than a ‘returns’.
Data and statistical methods
Respondents could apply for their test kit either online or via
text message. Those who requested online (through a computer or
their mobile) had to ﬁll out a questionnaire (Appendix 5) with
personal details. We only have gender and postcode for those who
requested via text. Those requesting a kit via Freetest.me’s website
supplied their gender, age, ethnicity, postcode, self-reported sexual
history (whether respondent had new sexual partner in the last
three months, more than two sexual partners in the past 12
months, used a condom the last time had sex and partner gender(s)
in the last 3 months) and previous test history for chlamydia over
the past 12 months including previous test results. We also know
which PCT covers each participant, date of test request and date of
test return (if applicable). We used respondents’ PCTs to classify our
sample by region (Department of Health, 2011).
Full postcodes determined each participant’s IMD score (mea-
sure of socioeconomic status). The UK postcode system is very
precise allowing for identiﬁcation by actual street and not just area.
IMD scores capture socioeconomic status through a weighted
composite measure including seven domains (e.g. income,
employment, health and disability) with 38 indicators in total
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011). To
maintain respondent anonymity, Preventx only supplied us with
the ﬁrst three letters of postcodes. Instead, Preventx sent respon-
dent identiﬁcation numbers and their full postcodes to a third party
researcher. These researchers mapped postcodes supplied by Pre-
ventx to each participant’s LSOA (Lower Super Output Area). Each
participant’s LSOA when then linked to the IMD score associated
with his/her LSOA using the IMD 2010 index values.
We estimate the effect of any of the non-cash ﬁnancial incentive
structures on chlamydia test specimen sample return likelihood
using multivariate logistic regressions clustering participants based
on the ﬁrst three letters of their postcodes.We use interaction terms
to examine the extent to which participant socioeconomic status
might inﬂuence the effectiveness of any of the incentives tested. We
ensured speciﬁcation robustness using variance inﬂation factors,
the regression error misspeciﬁcation test (Jones, 2007) and omitted
variable bias checks. We performed all analyses in STATA 12.1.Incentive contingent upon
returning the kit
fer N/A
o voucher Yes
co voucher Yes
ottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff and
f a £50 Tesco voucher
yes
receiving a £5 Tesco voucher or being
e lottery described above
yes
receiving a £10 Tesco voucher or being
ottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff
ce of a £100 Tesco voucher
Yes
o voucher with kit No
co voucher with kit No
ation on their behalf to Children in
dren’s charity)
Yes
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Study characteristics
The majority of respondents (95.5%) applied for their test kit
online and thus had to ﬁll out a questionnaire with personal details
(n ¼ 2850) to receive their test kit. Therefore, the response rate for
the survey among this groupwas 100%. 4.6% of the sample (n¼ 138)
requested via text therefore we only have their gender and post-
code at a minimum. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of our
sample. It includes all respondents. Those requesting a kit by textTable 2
Descriptive statistics of the sample by study round.
Round 1
(n ¼ 1489)
Round 2
(n ¼ 1499)
Total
(n ¼ 2988)
Mean Mean Mean
Returned kit within 30 days 71.3 70.8 71.0
Incentive structure
Control 16.8 20.0 18.4
GBP 5 voucher 16.5 20.2 18.4
GBP 10 voucher e 20.1 10.1
Lottery EV GBP 5 16.6 e 8.3
Choice EV GBP 5 16.6 e 8.3
Choice EV GBP 10 e 20.3 10.2
GBP 5 endowment 16.8 e 8.4
GBP 10 endowment e 19.3 9.7
GBP 5 charity 16.7 e 8.3
Gender
Male 32.6 34.7 33.7
Level of poverty/deprivation
Index of Multiple Deprivation
(IMD) Scoreb
20.4 (14.34) 20.0 (13.92) 20.2 (14.13)
Age
16e19 years 33.0 28.4 30.7a
20e24 years 66.3 66.6 66.4
Age missing 0.7 5.0 2.9a
Ethnicity
White 88.4 84.6 86.5a
Black 1.05 1.3 1.4
Asian 1.7 0.9 1.3
Other race 0.3 0.3 0.3
Mixed ethnicity 3.1 3.1 3.1
Unknown 4.9 9.7 7.3a
New partner in the last 3 months
Yes 62.8 60.4 61.6
No 26.8 23.7 25.3
Unknown 10.4 15.9 13.2a
Two or more sexual partners
in last 12 months
Yes 68.2 63.0 65.6a
No 22.0 21.3 21.7
Unknown 9.80 15.6 12.7a
Chlamydia test in the last 12 months
Yes, positive test 33.4 33.0 33.2
Yes, negative test 8.30 7.5 7.9
No 48.8 46.3 47.6
Unknown 9.50 13.2 11.4a
Condom use when last had sex
Yes 16.9 16.3 16.6
No 71.5 67.9 69.7a
Unknown 11.6 15.7 13.7a
Notes: A response of ‘unknown’ means that the respondent was asked the question
but responded ‘ I’d rather not say’ in the online questionnaire when requesting his/
her kit or requested their test kit via text message and therefore did not have the
opportunity to ﬁll in the online questionnaire.
‘Age missing’ includes 8 participants who were either over the age of 24 or gave an
inaccurate age ﬁgure (e.g. 100, 111). They would not have been eligible for NCSP
testing and therefore were denoted as ‘age missing’ along with those who requested
their kit by text and did not report an age.
a Statistically signiﬁcant difference (at the 95% level) in means between charac-
teristics of sample in Round 1 and Round 2.
b Figure in parenthesis is standard deviation.and those who asked survey questions online but choosing the
response ‘I’d rather not say’ were included as ‘unknown’ responses.
Respondents weremostly white (86.5%), female (66.3%), had two or
more sexual partners in the last twelve months (65.6%), had a new
partner in the last three months (61.6%) and did not use a condom
the last time they had sex (69.7%). The median age was 21 years.
41.1% of the group had taken a chlamydia test in the past year while
33.2% had already tested positive for chlamydia in the past year. The
mean IMD score was 20.2 with a distribution ranging from 0.61 to
87.8. Our sample population is slightly less deprived than the
general population of England, which has a mean IMD score of 21.7
(Pendle Council, 2010).
Baseline characteristics for all groups for both rounds were also
similar (Tables 3 and 4). In order to elect the most statistically
robust analysis plan, we tested whether the groups randomized to
control and £5 voucher (the two arms common to both study
rounds) were different from each other using ANOVA tests. If they
were not, combining these two groups would be appropriate. The
groups were not statistically signiﬁcant different according to any
characteristics except in two cases: for the control group, the per-
centage of Asian participants was lower in Round 2 (0.7%) than in
Round 1 (3.2%) at a 5% signiﬁcance level; and for the £5 voucher, the
percentage of respondents having not used a condom the last time
they had sex was higher in Round 1 (76.0%) than in Round 2 (65.7%)
at a 1% signiﬁcance level. Given similarities across treatment arms
and the ability for our multivariate analysis to mediate some of
these effects by controlling for study round, combining the samples
allows us to examine the study with greater statistical power.
Effect of incentives on specimen return rates
The overall return rate was 71.0%. We see only very minor dif-
ferences in return rates across incentive structures and none are
statistically signiﬁcantly different from the control or each other
(Fig. 1 and Table 5). The group receiving the £5 voucher regardless
of their behavior and those receiving the £5 voucher on sample
return had the highest rates of return (73.2%) while those receiving
an endowment of a £10 voucher had the lowest (67.9%). The control
group had a return rate of 69.4%. For those given a choice of reward
on returning their kit, the voucher was the more popular choice as
64.6% (56.8% when expect value (EV) was £5 and 71.5% when EV
was £10) chose it versus only 11.3% electing to take part in the
lottery (18.2% and 5.6%, respectively). When the value of the certain
option (voucher) goes up, individuals are less willing to take the
risk of the lottery. The remaining individuals in these treatment
groups did not return a slip, did not ﬁll it out or chose both options
(24.1% total, 25.6% and 22.9%, respectively).
As for other factors inﬂuencing the likelihood of specimen
sample return, those participants who were of lower socioeco-
nomic status, younger (ages 15e19) were less likely to return a
sample for testing while those who had previously tested positive
for chlamydia were more likely to do so. Study round was not a
signiﬁcant predictor of sample return suggesting that any differ-
ential characteristics of the population samples in Rounds 1 and 2
did not introduce a bias.
Socioeconomic status and incentives
While offering non-cash ﬁnancial incentives appears tomake no
difference in return rates for the general population, they might
matter for population sub-sets. We see that likelihood of returning
a specimen sample was positively related to socioeconomic status.
For a one unit increase in IMD score, the odds of returning a sample
decreased by 1%. We used interaction terms to test whether IMD
score would inﬂuence whether incentives make a difference in
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incentive structures demonstrating no differential effect of any of
the incentives across deprivation level. Therefore, non-cash ﬁnan-
cial incentives worked similarly based on an individual’s socio-
economic status.
Discussion
In this randomized experiment, we showed that a variety of
non-cash ﬁnancial incentives made no difference to the rate of
sample return in an online request, mail-back specimen chlamydia
screening program targeting 16e24 year old English males and
females. The sample size and randomized study design in a natural
setting as well as the breadth of incentive designs tested contribute
to the robustness of this ﬁnding. While it is not surprising that
participant characteristics such as age, deprivation level and pre-
vious chlamydia history would affect the likelihood of returning a
sample for testing, non-cash ﬁnancial incentives, at least in some
form, might be expected to alter any cost/beneﬁt calculation
regarding whether or not to return a sample. Even more so when
well-known theoretical concepts from behavioral economics
motivated the design of incentive schemes tested here.
That we ﬁnd no effect is not to say that the theories behind them
do not hold, rather that context matterse and this context does not
support them. These results could be context speciﬁc to this largely
Internet-based method of undertaking chlamydia screening and/or
for STI screening in general, though other studies have shown some
effects in precisely this context. The majority of those requesting a
test kit may have some personal reason to do so and thus are not
swayed by any extra enticement. The control group’s return rate
would be considered high for at home chlamydia testing (Ford,
Viadro, & Miller, 2004; Sacks-Davis, Gold, Aitken, & Hellard,
2010), but is in line with Freetest.me’s usual return rate. Curiously,
about 30% of kits requested from Freetest.me are normally not
returned, suggesting that even if young people have some reason or
reasons to request one, these reasons are not strong enough to
induce return in about one in three cases. The reasons why in-
centives cannot nudge this number downwards is worthy of further
exploration.
This study’s ﬁndings support the lack of effect found in Low et al.
(2007) for a £10 voucher on chlamydia screening in the UK. Our
ﬁndings differ from those of Zenner et al. (2012) who found a small
but signiﬁcant effect on chlamydia screening uptake among the
same population group tested here when offering participants
vouchers. Zenner et al. (2012) differs considerably in design to this
study as it exploits differences in PCTs’ uses of ﬁnancial incentives
for chlamydia screening and therefore could not control for how
individual patient characteristics might inﬂuence the effect of
ﬁnancial incentives.
A number of studies have found ﬁnancial incentives to be
effective in chlamydia screening (Currie et al., 2010; Currie et al.,
2013; Niza et al., 2013) as well as in other health contexts such as
smoking cessation in pregnancy (Lumley et al., 2009), smoking
more generally when using a large sample and incentive size
(Volpp et al., 2009) and vaccinations (Seal et al., 2003; Topp et al.,
2013). In Currie et al. (2010), the effect of the incentive could not
be isolated from the fact that those given ﬁnancial incentives were
offered screening via text message versus a comparison group with
no incentive receiving the screening offer via student organizations
and media sources. The study examined two chlamydia screening
program options rather than the effect of incentives in isolation.
Currie et al. (2013) took place in a community pharmacy-based
chlamydia screening program. They found a 93% return rate
when young people returned the kit directly to the pharmacy
where they picked it up and received an immediate reward of $A10
Table 4
Baseline characteristics by group, Round 2. Figures are mean values (95% CI).
Control (n ¼ 299) GBP 5 voucher
(n-303)
GBP 10 voucher
(n-302)
Choice with EV
of GBP 10 (n ¼ 305)
GBP 10 endowment
(n ¼ 290)
Socio-demographic characteristics
Male 0.365 (0.310e0.419) 0.333 (0.280e0.387) 0.348 (0.294e0.402) 0.344 (0.291e0.398) 0.345 (0.290e0.400)
Index of Multiple Deprivation
(IMD) Score
19.3 (17.7e20.8) 20.3 (18.8e21.9) 20.2 (18.9e21.7) 19.9 (18.3e21.4) 20.2 (18.6e21.9)
Age 20.7 (20.4e20.9) 20.7 (20.4e20.9) 20.8 (20.6e21.1) 20.8 (20.6e21.1) 20.8 (20.6e21.1)
White 0.836 (0.794e0.878) 0.851 (0.811e0.892) 0.844 (0.803e0.885) 0.836 (0.794e0.878) 0.862 (0.822e0.902)
Black 0.013 (0.000e0.026) 0.007 (0.003e0.016) 0.017 (0.002e0.031) 0.020 (0.004e0.035) 0.010 (0.001e0.022)
Asian 0.007 (0.003e0.016) 0.013 (0.000e0.026) 0.010 (0.001e0.021) 0.013 (0.000e0.026) 0.003 (0.003e0.010)
Mixed Ethnicity 0.027 (0.008e0.045) 0.030 (0.010e0.049) 0.036 (0.015e0.058) 0.039 (0.017e0.061) 0.024 (0.006e0.042)
Sexual history
No new partner in the last
3 months
0.244 (0.195e0.293 0.267 (0.217e0.317) 0.228 (0.181e0.276) 0.223 (0.176e0.270) 0.224 (0.176e0.272)
Not had two or more partners
in last 12 months
0.191 (0.146e0.235) 0.224 (0.177e0.272) 0.225 (0.178e0.273) 0.213 (0.167e0.259) 0.214 (0.166e0.261)
Yes, positive chlamydia test in
the last 12 months
0.351 (0.297e0.406 0.307 (0.255e0.359) 0.348 (0.294e0.402) 0.318 (0.265e0.371) 0.324 (0.270e0.378)
Yes, negative chlamydia test in
the last 12 months
0.070 (0.041e0.099) 0.079 (0.049e0.110) 0.073 (0.043e0.102) 0.075 (0.046e0.105) 0.076 (0.045e0.107)
No condom use when last had sex 0.656 (0.601e0.710) 0.657 (0.603e0.711) 0.682 (0.629e0.735) 0.692 (0.640e0.744) 0.714 (0.661e0.766)
Same sex partner in the last
3 months
0.017 (0.002e0.031) 0.010 (0.001e0.021) 0.013 (0.000e0.026) 0.013 (0.000e0.026) 0.014 (0.000e0.027)
Partners of both sexes in the
last 3 months
0.027 (0.008e0.045) 0.017 (0.002e0.031) 0.026 (0.008e0.045) 0.020 (0.004e0.035) 0.024 (0.006e0.042)
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leaving contact details). Our study may present a barrier for young
people by requiring that they mail back a specimen. The design of
Niza et al. (2013) also allowed participants to receive the £5 voucher
immediately upon kit return or be entered into the lottery. Niza
et al. (2013) covered largely the same population (started at 18
rather than 16 years of age) but was a sample of London university
students given the offer of a test kit and therefore might inherently
differ from the England-wide population requesting test kits in this
study. The cluster randomization design in Niza et al. (2013) also
differs from the individual-level randomization undertaken in
this study and thus could account for some of the heterogeneity in
ﬁndings.
As for successful ﬁnancial incentives programs in other health
contexts, standard economic theory would suggest that if in-
centives were sufﬁciently large enough, they would evoke the ex-
pected behavioral response but this is an inefﬁcient, impractical
and ﬁnancially unsustainable policy solution.Fig. 1. Percentage of test kits returned by incentive group. Note: Error bars represent 95% co
85% level.This study also demonstrates that non-cash ﬁnancial incentives
had no disproportionately greater or weaker effects depending on
participant socioeconomic status as measured used IMD scores.
Although we see that IMD score predicts specimen sample return
rate and therefore deprivation level plays a role in screening up-
take, deprivation does not diminish or increase the effectiveness of
the variety of incentive structures. This ﬁnding offers empirical
evidence that incentives may not be as effective as one might hope
to reduce inequalities in the uptake of even short-term medical
adherence behaviors (Oliver & Brown, 2012). The ﬁnancial in-
centives literature has not extensively examined the interaction
between socioeconomic status and ﬁnancial incentives and war-
rants further attention to see if these results hold across context
and population.
While IMD scores ﬁgure prominently in national and local policy
decision-making in the UK, they have methodological limitations
that must be recognized. When studying people and their behavior,
this measure may be relatively weak as IMD scores capture areanﬁdence intervals. *Difference between incentive and control group is signiﬁcant at the
Table 5
Predicting chlamydia sample return.
Sample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request
Round 1
Sample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request
Round 2
Sample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request
Round 1 þ 2
Odds ratio z-stat Odds ratio z-stat Odds ratio z-stat
Incentive structures
GBP 5 voucher 1.03 0.13 1.35 1.55 1.20 1.31
GBP 10 voucher e e 1.28 1.31 1.20 1.04
Lottery EV GBP 5 0.96 0.21 e e 1.06 0.30
Choice EV GBP 5 0.96 0.19 e e 1.03 0.15
Choice EV GBP 10 e e 1.06 0.32 1.02 0.13
GBP 5 endowment 1.12 0.53 e e 1.17 0.79
GBP 10 endowment e e 0.89 0.63 0.87 0.82
GBP 5 charity 0.88 0.60 e e 0.99 0.06
Socio-demographic characteristics
Male 1.03 0.21 0.83 1.42 0.95 0.64
IMD 0.99a 3.23 0.99 1.28 0.99a 3.11
20e24 years 1.49a 3.16 1.22 1.41 1.35a 3.21
Black 0.88 0.32 0.90 0.21 0.84 0.53
Asian 0.48c 1.81 0.95 0.09 0.61 1.56
Mixed ethnicity 1.13 0.31 1.05 0.13 1.11 0.39
Sexual history
No new partner in the last 3 months 0.87 0.85 0.84 1.04 0.87 1.29
Not had two or more partners in last 12 months 1.32 1.61 0.74c 1.74 1.00 0.00
Yes, positive chlamydia test in the last 12 months 1.54a 2.80 1.13 0.80 1.34a 2.56
Yes, negative chlamydia test in the last 12 months 1.25 1.02 0.74 1.13 0.94 0.34
No condom use when last had sex 0.68b 2.16 1.40c 1.85 0.98 0.21
Same sex partner in the last 3 months 0.47b 2.02 1.07 0.12 0.62c 1.66
Partners of both sexes in the last 3 months 0.43b 2.23 0.16a 4.77 0.27a 5.05
Study round 1 e e e e 0.93 0.49
Constant 2.76a 3.91 2.43a 2.88 2.51a 4.40
Number of observations 1489 1499 2988
Wald c2 (prob > c2) 82.71(0.000) 160.88 (0.000) 197.89 (0.000)
Log pseudolikelihood 852.2 788.8 1678.1
Pseudo r2 0.046 0.129 0.067
Note: Reference categories are control group, age 16e19 years, white, new partner in last 3 months, no Chlamydia test in the last 12 months, condom use when last had sex,
different sex partner in last 3 months and Study Round 2. Speciﬁcations also control for Strategic Health Authority in which individuals live, a proxy for region of England and
‘unknown’ responses to all independent variables (‘no answers’ and textmessage requests therefore questions were not asked). All models clustered by ﬁrst three letters of the
postcode with varying numbers of clusters based on sample size.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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particular issue when conducting a study with young people
because young people tend to live in areas of higher deprivation but
not necessarily be as deprived as the areawould reﬂect in their ownTable 6
The impact of incentives according to socioeconomic status.
Sample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request Round 1
Odds ratio z-stat
Incentive structure
IMD*GBP 5 voucher 1.00 0.07
IMD*GBP 10 voucher e e
IMD*lottery EV GBP 5 1.00 0.30
IMD*choice EV GBP 5 1.01 0.44
IMD*choice EV GBP 10 e e
IMD*GBP 5 endowment 0.99 0.54
IMD*GBP 10 endowment e e
IMD*GBP 5 charity 1.00 0.32
Number of observations 1489
Wald c2 (prob > c2) 88.36 (0.000)
Log pseudolikelihood 851.5
Pseudo r2 0.047
Note: These speciﬁcations include the same explanatory variables as speciﬁcations show
numbers of clusters based on sample size.household. IMD scores are also not a direct measure of deprivation
in the same way that individual household income or unemploy-
ment would be. They provide a thorough picture of deprivation but
at the area, not individual level (Department for Communities andSample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request Round 2
Sample returned in 30 days
from day of kit request Round
1 þ 2
Odds ratio z-stat Odds ratio z-stat
0.99 0.40 1.00 0.14
1.01 0.64 1.01 1.26
e e 1.00 0.15
e e 1.00 0.02
0.98 1.15 0.99 0.78
e e 0.99 1.11
0.99 0.59 1.00 0.24
e e 1.00 0.19
1499 2988
161.98 (0.000) 211.53 (0.000)
787.2 1675.6
0.131 0.069
n in Table 5. All models clustered by ﬁrst three letters of the postcode with varying
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priate as an estimate for socioeconomic status given the policy
implications for this research and our inability to collect direct
measures of socioeconomic status from the sample population.
Another potential limitation of this study is the selective sample.
The population consists of already motivated individuals, which
may have implications for the extent to which external motivation
in the form of non-cash ﬁnancial incentives makes a difference in
behavior. The sample is also slightly less deprived than the general
population of England. The study also focuses on an Internet-based
means of test requests, which may bias the sample as it is those
who have access to and the ability to use a computer or a cell phone
with mobile access. Given only the small difference in our mean
sample IMD scores and those of England, this bias is only a limited
concern. The intervention also targets young people for whom the
Internet is part of their everyday life. Chlamydia testing also differs
from other types of testing because the process requires returning
the kit via the dispensing system for a result and does not provide
an instant response such as in the case of, for example, pregnancy
tests.
To our knowledge, this is the largest randomized experiment
testing ﬁnancial incentives of any kind in the context of STIs and
one of the largest, most comprehensive trials of ﬁnancial incentives
to date.We also have data on a variety of relevant characteristics for
our sample beyond demographic variables including sexual history
and previous test results. This allows us to control for factors that
may inﬂuence return rates beyond incentives and more readily
isolate any effect of incentives.
In conclusion, our study suggests that non-cash ﬁnancial
incentives do not appear to affect the rate of specimen return in
a chlamydia screening program where individuals request test
kits online, receive them in the mail and return them by mail
and that these effects are no stronger or weaker depending on
socioeconomic status. Our study marks a step forward in the
examination of incentives because of its experimental design in
a natural setting, with a large sample size and testing of a variety
of incentives. To examine some of the issues raised here further,
a randomized experiment of speciﬁc population groups might be
most useful for targeting the implementation of incentives to at-
risk populations (e.g. those with a prior positive test, higher
poverty levels). One might also consider involving the target
population to design incentives tailored to them in efforts to
improve on effectiveness. In the meantime, we need to be alert
to the fact that incentives’ effectiveness, just like any other
intervention designed to inﬂuence behavior, will depend greatly
on context (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, Metcalfe, & Viaev, 2011).
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